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The influence of a fixed number of agents with the same fixed behavior on the dynamics of the
minority game is studied. Alternatively, the system studied can be considered the minority game
with a change in the comfort threshold away from half filling. Agents in the frustrated, non ergodic
phase tend to overreact to the information provided by the fixed agents, leading not only to large
fluctuations, but to deviations of the average occupancies from their optimal values. Agents which
discount their impact on the market, or which use individual strategies reach equilibrium states,
which, unlike in the absence of the external information provided by the fixed agents, do not give
the highest payoff to the collective.
I. INTRODUCTION
The minority game has become an extensively used
model of some aspects of financial markets [1]. It shows
that complex behavior can arise from relatively simple
mathematical rules, used to define a system of interacting
agents. In addition, it is amenable to analytical treat-
ment [2], and shows the usefulness of the methods of
statistical physics for the study of problems of interest
in economics, sociology, or biology [3]. The model has
been extensively analyzed, and it shows a phase transi-
tion between an ergodic phase, where the agents reach a
well defined stationary state, and a non ergodic phase,
where the evolution is strongly dependent on the initial
conditions [4]. The ergodic phase can be well charac-
terized by means of the replica formalism, well known
in studies of systems with quenched disorder. The dis-
order in the minority game arises from random differ-
ences between the agents, associated to the strategies at
their disposal (see below). There is no similar degree
of understanding of the behavior of the agents in the
non ergodic phase, where frustration and herding effects
play a major role in determining the long time evolution.
Relatively simple modifications of the rules of the game
change significantly the results, for the parameter range
where the ergodic phase occurs. These changes can mod-
ify, or even suppress, herding behavior. We can mention,
among other variations, evolution based schemes, which
allow for the use of the opposite outcome predicted by
the “best” strategy [5], agents which discount the effect of
their own choices on the market [6], or agents which use
individual, instead of global, information [7]. The case
where agents discount their impact on the market can be
studied analytically, and it can be shown that the dynam-
ics lead to a stationary state with small volatitlity, and
which optimizes the benefits to the collective [6, 8, 9]. It
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is known that, for the non ergodic phase in the standard
version of the minority game, the available information is
arbitraged away, making the difference between the ac-
tual histories and random data irrelevant [10]. On the
other hand, the outcome of the game shows a significant
dependence on the initial bias in the scores of the strate-
gies, when this bias is allowed to have a finite value[11].
In the present work, we will analyze further how the ex-
ternal information is processed in the non ergodic phase.
For that purpose, we will assume that a given num-
ber of agents make always the same choice, inducing a
bias in the outcome. The predictable behavior of these
fixed agents can be considered as an external information
source which can be processed by the remaining active
agents. If the active agents were playing at random, the
minority group would tend to be the one not preferred
by the fixed agents. This situation corresponds to having
a given number of correlated producers, in the general-
ization of the minority game described in [8, 9]. Alterna-
tively, we can consider that the “comfort threshold” for
the active agents has been shifted away from half filling
by the presence of the agents with fixed choices. This
situation was already considered in the initial version of
the minority game [12], and it has been further studied
in [13]. An extension of the analytical results for the
standard minority game to a situation where the “com-
fort threshold” has been shifted can be found in [14].
A situation where all strategies used by the agents are
biased towards a given outcome is discussed in [15]. A
related situation is that in which some agents prefer to be
in the majority, considered in [16]. The existence of these
“trend followers”, however, is not a source of information
for the other agents.
The models studied will be more precisely defined in
the following section. We present the main results in sec-
tion III. Finally, section IV summarizes the conclusions,
and compares the results with related work.
2II. THE MODELS
We study the minority game defined in the usual way.
There are N agents which use s strategies each, assigned
initially at random. These strategies associate a given
binary outcome to a series of m binary numbers, which
represent the history of the game in the previous m time
steps. The number of possible strategies is 22
m
. The goal
of the agents is to choose the minority group, that is, the
one chosen by less than half of the agents, N/2. There
is a given number of agents Nf which always make the
same choice, 1. Hence, the number of “active” agents is
N − Nf . The maximum number of active agents which
can win at a given time is, obviously, N/2, whenN/2−Nf
active agents make the choice 1, and the remaining N/2
choose 0. The game becomes trivial if Nf ≥ N/2, as all
the active agents will profit from making the choice 0.
Note that in the standard version of the minority game
there will be, on the average, a fraction 2−s of agents
unable to make this choice, as the strategies available to
them lead only to choice 1. The results to be discussed
are averages over the possible distributions of strategies
among agents.
We study three versions of the model, which differ
in the way the score of the strategies available to the
agents are updated, or in the information processed by
the agents:
i) The standard minority game, as defined in [1]. Each
agent updates the score of the strategies available to it
according to whether the predicted outcome was success-
ful (one point is added to the score) or unsuccessful (zero
points are added).
ii) The individual minority game, as defined in [7]. The
input used by each agent in order to decide the outcome
predicted by a given strategy is the succession of events
that it has experienced. A given (individual) history thus
corresponds to the series of choices made by the agent.
iii) The minority game where agents discount the im-
pact of the strategy which they have used on the global
result [2, 6, 8]. In order to take the impact into ac-
count, the score of the strategies is updated considering
what would have happened if the agent had taken the op-
posite decision, and rewards the strategy used. For that
purpose, we follow the linear payoff introduced in ref. [2],
which considers an increase in the score of each strategy
s of agent i in time t of ∆ = −as,i(t)A(t)/P +ηδs,si(t)/P ;
as,i is the prediction of strategy s (in terms of {−1, 1}),
A(t) = N1(t)−N0(t), and η is the reward to the strategy
played. In the following we use η = 0.5.
In all three cases, the total number of agents is N ,
which is taken to be an odd number. Then, the number
of winners cannot exceed (N − 1)/2. The fixed agents
can also be on the winning side, and the same bound
also applies to the winners among the active agents. In
all three cases, the distribution of strategies among the
active agents is completely random, with no particular
correlation among the strategies at the disposal of each
agent. The initial score of the strategies is set to zero, and
thus the s strategies assigned to each agent are equally
good.
As mentioned in the introduction, the existence of Nf
players which always make the same choice is equivalent
to a minority game with no fixed players, but where the
“comfort” threshold has been shifted. We can assume
that there are only N −Nf agents, but that the winning
outcome is 0 when the number of agents which make that
choice is less thanN/2, which, in this case, is greater than
one half of the number of agents.
III. RESULTS
A. The phase transition.
The analytical study of the minority game [2] allows us
to determine the existence and location, of the transition
between the ergodic and non ergodic phase as function
of the number of fixed agents, Nf . Following ref. [8],
the fixed agents considered here play the role of “pro-
ducers”. These producers have only one strategy, which,
in our case, is the same for all of them, and it gives
the same decision for each possible history, so that, in
the notation in [8], they are maximally correlated. The
analytical results obtained there, valid in the “thermo-
dynamic” limit when the number of agents and available
strategies is large, describe how the phase transition be-
tween the symmetric and asymmetric phase depends on
the the fraction of effective producers, which can be writ-
ten as ρ ≈ N2f /N . This number is large, ρ ≫ 1, which
allows us to expand the implicit expression for the crit-
ical value of ρ, in the Appendix in [8]. We find that, at
the transition:
N∗f ≈
N
2m/2
√
pi
(1)
when the number of strategies per agent is s = 2. When
the number of fixed agents, Nf > N
∗
f , the game is in
the ergodic phase. The expression in eq. (1) ceases to
be valid when the assumption ρ ≫ 1 fails, that is, for
N∗f ≪
√
N .
When Nf = 0 and s = 2, there is a phase transition for
N = N∗ ≈ 2m/0.3374. Results for different quantities
and for the three versions of the minority game described
in the previous section are shown in Fig. [1]. The num-
ber of agents is 1001. All quantities displayed have been
calculated by averaging over 100 series of 300× 2m time
steps, after the system has achieved a stationary state,
each series corresponding to a different initial distribu-
tion of strategies among the active agents.
In the ergodic phase the discount of the market im-
pact ceases to be relevant, and the volatility displayed
in Fig. [1] is the same for cases i) and iii) defined in the
previous section. The value N∗f at which this transition
takes place is well described by eq. (1). Similar results
are obtained for other values of the number of strategies
3FIG. 1: Results for different quantities in the three versions
of the minority game discussed in the text, as function of the
number of agents which make the fixed choice 1. The total
number of agents is 1001. The number of strategies per agent
is s = 2. Right column: m = 2. Left column: m = 4. Stars:
standard minority game. Squares: Individual minority game.
Solid circles: Minority game where the impact of the strategy
used is taken into account. Top: Average number of agents
which make choice 0. Middle: Average number of winners.
Bottom: dispersion in the value of the number of agents which
make choice 0.
FIG. 2: As in Fig. [1], but for s = 4. Note the different scale
used for the vertical axes.
FIG. 3: Transition between the ergodic and the non ergodic
phase as function of the agents’ memory, m, and s = 2. Cir-
cles: numerical results. Full line: Nf/N = 1/
√
piP , using the
analysis in [8, 14].
assigned to each agent, as shown in Fig. [2]. The transi-
tion is shifted towards higher values of Nf as we increase
the number of strategies s available to each agent, and
the tendency for the agents to overreact to the informa-
tion provided by the fixed agents in the standard version
of the game and in the non ergodic phase is more pro-
nounced (see 〈N0〉 in figs. [1] and [2]).
The fluctuations in the size of the minority group are
reduced by the presence of fixed agents, in qualitative
agreement with [15]. The fraction of winners among the
active agents is constant, within our numerical accuracy,
in the non ergodic phase, and then it increases signifi-
cantly as one enters the ergodic phase. The increase is
also in agreement with the results in [15], where the ef-
ficiency of the game was increased with a biased pool of
strategies. The initial plateau of the fraction of winners
among the active players also agrees qualitatively with
the slow rise found in [15].
The transition from the non ergodic (symmetric) phase
to the ergodic (asymmetric) phase, as function of the
memory of the agents, m, is shown in Fig. [3]. For com-
parison, we also show the transition line obtained using
the analytical calculation in [8].
When the number of fixed agents is sufficiently large,
the number of winners is equal to the number of agents
which make choice 0, that is, which avoid the group
chosen by the fixed agents. In addition, the dynamics
converges to a stationary state where all agents which
have the appropriate strategies available make choice 0.
There is only one history describing the winning choice
in this regime, ...00000.... On average, there is a frac-
tion 2−m of active agents which cannot make use of the
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FIG. 4: Number of agents which make choice 0 (the opposite
to that made by the fixed agents) as function of time, for a
given initial distribution of strategies, and different number
of strategies, s, per agent. The total number of agents is
N = 1001, the memory is m = 2, and the number of fixed
agents is Nf = 50. Solid line: s = 2. Broken line: s = 6.
winning strategies, ...00000... → 0. Thus, the average
number of active agents which make the correct choice,
0, is N0 = (1− 2−m)(N −Nf ). This situation is stable if
the N0 agents are indeed in the minority group, that is,
if N0 < N/2, which implies:
Nf >
2m−1 − 1
2m − 1 N (2)
This inequality gives the threshold for the trivial dynam-
ics when the number of fixed agents is sufficiently large,
deep into the ergodic phase.
B. The non ergodic phase. “Overscreening” effects.
Inside the non ergodic phase, Nf < N
∗
f , where the
value of N∗f is given in eq. (1), the number of agents
making the opposite choice of that of the fixed agents,
N0, is such that N0 ≥ N/2 in the non ergodic phase,
when the number of fixed agents is not zero (see fig. [6]).
This choice makes the outcome highly unfavorable for the
collective of active agents as the number of agents which
can win cannot exceed N/2.
The benefits of the collective in the non ergodic phase
increase greatly when the agents are able to discount the
impact of the strategies on the outcome, or use their own
individual histories. Note that when agents discount the
impact of the strategies, the score of a given strategy is
not the same for all agents, making the situation some-
what similar to that in the individual minority game. In
both variations of the standard minority game the num-
ber of winning agents, Nw, is about half the number of
active agents, Nw ≈ (N−Nf)/2. This is below the maxi-
mum number of possible winners, which is N/2, provided
that Nf < N/2.
The most striking result is that, in the standard ver-
sion of the minority game, the number of active agents
which make choice 0 is larger than its optimal value in
the non ergodic phase. This choice is the opposite to the
choice made by the fixed agents. Thus, the active agents
perceive the existence of the fixed agents, but there is a
herding effect which induces them to make the opposite
choice in numbers above the appropriate comfort level.
In the language of a random spin model [18], the ac-
tive agents “overscreen” the external field induced by the
fixed agents.
C. The non ergodic phase. Dynamics.
We have analyzed the “overscreening” of the informa-
tion provided by the fixed agents in the standard minority
game by studying individual time series in the non er-
godic phase. Results are shown in Fig. [4], for a memory
of two time steps, m = 2, and s = 2 and s = 6 strategies
per active agent. The time series show well defined cycles
with periodicity greater than the time horizon available
to the agents, who are unable to make use of this infor-
mation, as in the standard minority game without fixed
agents [19]. These cycles are sometimes interrupted by
strong deviations when s = 6. The origin of these spikes
is unclear, although it is consistent with the enhancement
of herding effects as the value of s increases.
For the case m = 2 the typical cycle spans eight
time steps, where the winning choice follows the series
...11100010.... We can understand this cycle by assum-
ing that there are two strategies with the highest score
being used by the agents. These strategies are mutu-
ally opposite. They can be considered as representative
of broad classes of strategies with similar outcomes [21].
We further assume that the score of these strategies can
either differ by one unit (the minimum amount) or be
equal, in which case the strategy used is decided by a
coin toss. Then, i) At the beginning of the cycle the his-
tory processed by the agents is 11. We assume that the
strategy with the highest score predicts 11 → 0. The
majority of active agents follows this strategy so that the
winning choice is 1. The score of this strategy and that
of its opposite, 11 → 1 becomes equal. ii) The history
processed by the agents remains 11. The active agents
take a random decision, and the majority group is de-
termined by the fixed agents. The winning choice is 0,
and the strategy 11 → 0 becomes again the one with
the highest score. iii) We now assume that the strategies
predicting the two opposite outcomes after the history
10 have equal score. The active agents make a random
decision, and the outcome is determined by the choice of
the fixed agents. The winning choice is 0, and the scores
5History Strategy with the Winning choice
highest score
11 11→ 0 1
11 tie 0
10 tie 0
00 tie 0
00 00→ 0 1
01 tie 0
10 10→ 0 1
01 01→ 0 1
TABLE I: Histories and strategies which lead to the cycle
shown in Fig. [4].
are updated accordingly. iv) We assume again that the
strategies 00 → 0 and 00 → 1 have the same score. The
winning choice is 0, and the scores are updated. v) The
active agents use the history 00 and take choice 0. The
winning choice becomes 1, and the two strategies 00→ 0
and 00 → 1 have again the same score. vi) The history
is 01. If the strategies predicting the two possible out-
comes have the same score, the winning choice will be 0.
vii) The history now is 10. The strategy with the high-
est score is 10 → 0, as fixed in step iii). The winning
choice is 1. viii) The history is 01. The strategy with the
highest score is 01→ 0, as fixed in step vi). The winning
choice is 1, and the cycle repeats itself. This succession
of events is schematically shown in Table[I].
The influence of the fixed agents is to determine the
outcome in cases where two strategies which lead to op-
posite choices have the same score. The existence of these
situations in the standard minority game leads to a rich
structure in the size of the groups [22], and to Gaussian
fluctuations around the average values, due to the ran-
domness in the outcomes. This randomness disappears in
the presence of fixed agents. When two opposite strate-
gies have the same score, around half of the active agents
make one choice and the other half makes the opposite.
The existence of fixed agents determines the majority
group, which is that chosen by the fixed agents. Then,
the active agents have a strong bias towards the oppo-
site group the next time that the same history presents
itself. This tendency leads to the overscreening of the
information provided by the fixed agents. If the number
of time steps in the history processed by the agents is m,
the cycle is usually of 2m+1 steps. These cycles appear in
the non ergodic phase, where a majority of active agents
are able to distinguish the “best” strategies. The ten-
dency towards overscreening increases with the number
s of strategies available to the agents.
The information available to the agents in the series
in Fig. [4], vanishes, because the outcome after a given
history is totally unpredictable. Then, as we are using
a binary payoff, the difference between the scores of the
s strategies of each agent averages to zero. This can be
seen in Fig. [6], where we show how θ (θ2 = 12m
∑
µ〈(2ψ−
1)|µ〉2, ψ is the minority group in each time step), which
indicates the amount of information on the time series is
zero in the non ergodic phase.
D. Influence of the payoff function.
It is interesting to study the changes in the non ergodic
phase when the payoff function used in updating the score
of the strategies is proportional to the deviation from the
optimal occupancy, instead of a step function, as com-
monly used when analytical methods are applied to the
minority game [2]. In this case, the condition that there
is no information available to the agents implies that the
average payoff for each strategy is zero. In order for this
to happen, 〈N0〉 = N/2 should be satisfied. Hence, the
tendency towards overscreening in the ergodic phase de-
scribed above does not lead to deviations of 〈N0〉 from its
“natural” value. There is, however, a significant asymme-
try in the distribution P (N0), as shown in Fig. [5]. There
is a range of values of N0 near N/2 for which P (N0) is bi-
ased towards N0 > N/2, as in the minority game with a
binary payoff. This effect is compensated by the inverse
asymmetry of P (N0) when N0 ≈ 0 or N0 ≈ N . Note
that, for the standard situation with no fixed agents, the
distribution P (N0) is significantly different from that in
the minority game with a binary payoff [22].
FIG. 5: Distribution P (N0) for the minority game with two
strategies per agent. The results are averaged over 100 initial
distributions of strategies. The total number of agents is N =
1001. Nf is the number of fixed agents. Top: linear payoff.
Left: m = 2 and Nf = 0. Center left: m = 4 and Nf = 0.
Center right: m = 2 and Nf = 60. Right: m = 4 and
Nf = 60. Bottom: binary payoff. Left: m = 2 and Nf = 0.
Center left: m = 4 and Nf = 0. Center right: m = 2 and
Nf = 60. Right: m = 4 and Nf = 60.
6400
450
500
550
400
450
500
550
0.01
0.1
1
10
0.01
0.1
1
10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 100 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
FIG. 6: Comparison of results for the standard minority game with fixed agents obtained with the histories generated by the
dynamics of the game (crosses), and random histories (squares). First row: Average number of agents which make the choice
opposite to that of the fixed agents, 〈N0〉. Second row: Dispersion in N0. Third row: Fraction of frozen agents. Fourth row:
Information stored in the dynamics (see [2] ). The number of fixed agents, Nf , is represented in the horizontal axes. The
number of strategies available to the agents is s = 2. Different columns correspond to different history lengths, m = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10.
The results are calculated for a total of N = 1001 agents, averaged over 100 initial distributions of strategies and 300 × 2m
timesteps.
E. Random vs. actual histories.
We have studied the changes induced by replacing the
actual histories by random variables in the standard ver-
sion of the minority game, as initially discussed in [10].
The results are shown in Fig. [6]. We plot there a number
of statistical averages which serve to characterize the mi-
nority game, like the fraction of “frozen agents”, which
although in principle active, settle to use only one strat-
egy at long times, φ, and the information stored in the
history of the game [2], θ2, which is the bias towards one
of the two outcomes of the game when a given history
appears on the time series[20]. In the non ergodic phase,
the agents are not able to distinguish between the actual
histories and a succession of random events, as in the
minority game without bias [10]. In the ergodic phase,
however, the information provided by the fixed agents
becomes relevant, and there is a difference between the
actual game and that generated by a succession of ran-
dom events.
The cycles shown in Fig. [4] are due to the sequential
substitution of the strategy with the highest score by its
opposite. Hence, a random succession of histories can
give rise to the same overscreening. Thus, the results in
the non ergodic phase do not change when the histories
are random variables, as shown in Fig. [6]. The situation
changes in the ergodic phase. When the histories pro-
cessed by the agents are random but the winning choice is
constant in time, 0, the score of each strategy will depend
only on how often it contains 0 as an output. If the num-
ber of strategies at play is small, in the ergodic phase, the
strategies with the highest score will contain a significant
number of 1’s as outputs. Then, the agents will become
frozen, and make, with similar probability, the two possi-
ble choices. This explains the results in the first row and
7right columns (high values of m) in Fig. [6], where about
half of the active agents make the right choice, 0, and the
other half choose 1, when the histories are random. As
shown in the third row, most agents in this regime are
frozen and the information in the dynamically generated
histories is maximal [2] (fourth row in Fig. [6]). This situ-
ation, where a significant number of active agents become
frozen, is more difficult to achieve when the histories are
dynamically generated by the agents themselves.
Finally, while the dynamics of the standard minority
game in the non ergodic phase imply frequent situations
where agents make choices using a coin toss, see table[I],
the actual outcome of the game is fixed. Hence, we do not
expect that this non deterministic aspect of the dynamics
will play a significant role [23].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the minority game when a given num-
ber of agents make always the same choice. Hence, from
the point of view of the remaining, active, agents, the
predictable behavior of the fixed agents can be consid-
ered a source of external information. We have analyzed
the standard version, the variant where agents use indi-
vidual information, and that in which agents are able to
discount the effect of their actions on the outcome.
The system shows a variety of interesting results in
the non ergodic phase, where the ability of the agents to
process the information available to them is highest:
i) In the standard minority game, the active agents
tend to overscreen the information provided by the fixed
agents, leading to disastrous effects for the collective (we
are using the analogy with spin models, where the ex-
ternal information can be viewed as an applied field, to
be screened by the dynamical spins which represent the
agents). The number of agents in the minority group
not only shows a large dispersion, as in the symmetric
minority game, but its average is far from the optimal
value. Assuming that there are N agents, of which Nf
make always the same choice, 1, we find that the average
of the number of active agents which make choice 0 is
〈N0〉 > N/2, while the optimal value is 〈N0〉 ≈ N/2.
ii) The overscreening of the external information can
be understood through the existence of cycles longer than
the amount of time steps which the agents are able to
process. The presence of the fixed agents determine the
outcome of the situations when opposite strategies have
the same score. This, in turn, leads to a strong bias of
the active agents towards the group not chosen by the
fixed agents. This bias proves catastrophic for the global
benefit of the active agents.
iii) The gain made by the collective of active agents in
the non ergodic phase is significantly improved when the
agents use individual information, or are able to discount
the effect of their own choices on the global outcome. The
dispersion in the number of agents in the minority group
is greatly reduced. The average number of winners, Nw,
however, fluctuates around the half the number of active
agents, 〈Nw〉 ≈ (N−Nf )/2, while the maximum number
of possible winners is N/2, for Nf < N/2.
iv) The results for the non ergodic phase are qualita-
tively the same when agents use individual information,
and for the case where agents discount the effect of their
strategies on the outcome. This is probably due to the
fact that, in both cases, the score assigned to a given
strategy is different for different agents.
These features imply that the existence of an external
bias in the non ergodic phase of different versions of the
minority game significantly reduces the global benefit of
the agents with respect to the maximum possible value,
which increases as external information is fed into the
system.
The situation where the agents achieve the highest col-
lective payoff, with respect to the maximum payoff which
can be achieved takes place when the number of fixed
agents vanishes. This fact is not contradictory with an in-
crease in the efficiency of the game in absolute terms [15],
as the opportunities for a given active agent are signifi-
cantly increased by the presence of fixed agents.
On the other hand, the predictability of the outcome,
in the non ergodic phase, is zero, as any outcome is pos-
sible after a given history [14], despite the fact that the
agents fail to guess the correct “comfort” threshold.
We have not considered here the influence of varying
the initial scores of the strategies, which is expected to
change the volatility in the non ergodic phase [6, 11].
The fact that the active agents are unable to remove the
external information in the ergodic phase is in agreement
with the results in [14].
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